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Abstract
Everett’s theory assumes (1) the completeness of the description
by the wave function, (2) the linearity of the dynamics for the wave
function, and (3) multiplicity. In this paper, I argue that these three as-
sumptions of Everett’s theory may lead to the violation of psychophys-
ical supervenience.
Everett’s theory assumes that the wave function of a physical system is
a complete description of the system, and the wave function always evolves
in accord with the linear Schro¨dinger equation. In order to solve the mea-
surement problem, the theory further assumes that after a measurement
with many possible results there appear many equally real worlds, in each
of which there is an observer who is aware of a definite result (Everett, 1957;
DeWitt and Graham, 1973; Wallace, 2012). In this paper, I will argue that
Everett’s theory may violate psychophysical supervenience.
Consider a simple spin measurement. First, suppose an observer M
measures the x-spin of a spin one-half system S being x-spin up, |up〉S . By
the Schro¨dinger equation, the physical state of the composite system after
the measurement will evolve into the product state of M recording x-spin
up and S being x-spin up:
|up〉S |up〉M . (1)
According to Everett’s theory, there is still one observer, namely the original
observer, after the measurement, and she is consciously aware of a definite
record, x-spin up.
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Similarly, when the observer M measures the x-spin of a spin one-half
system S being x-spin down, |down〉S , the physical state of the compos-
ite system after the measurement will evolve into the product state of M
recording x-spin down and S being x-spin down:
|down〉S |down〉M . (2)
Again, according to Everett’s theory, there is still one observer, namely the
original observer, after the measurement, and she is consciously aware of a
definite record, x-spin down.
Now consider a unitary time evolution operator, which changes |up〉S |up〉M
to |down〉S |down〉M and |down〉S |down〉M to |up〉S |up〉M , namely swaps the
above two product states. It is similar to the NOT gate for a single q-bit,
and is permitted by the Schro¨dinger equation in principle. Then after the
evolution, the composite system being initially in the product state of M
recording x-spin up and S being x-spin up will be in the product state of
M recording x-spin down and S being x-spin down, namely
|up〉S |up〉M → |down〉S |down〉M . (3)
According to Everett’s theory, there is still one observer, namely the original
observer, after the unitary time evolution, and her mental state changes from
being aware of x-spin up to being aware of x-spin down.
Similarly, after the unitary time evolution, the composite system being
initially in the product state of M recording x-spin down and S being x-
spin down will be in the product state of M recording x-spin up and S being
x-spin up, namely
|down〉S |down〉M → |up〉S |up〉M . (4)
Again, according to Everett’s theory, there is still one observer, namely the
original observer, after the unitary time evolution, and her mental state
changes from being aware of x-spin down to being aware of x-spin up.
These results are plain and familiar. Obviously the above evolution sat-
isfies the principle of psychophysical supervenience. The mental state of the
composite system or the mental state of the corresponding observer changes
with the change of the physical state of the composite system. Here superve-
nience is used in its standard definition. A set of properties A supervenes on
another set B in case no two things can differ with respect to A-properties
without also differing with respect to their B-properties (see McLaughlin
and Bennett, 2014). By this definition, psychophysical supervenience re-
quires that the mental properties of a system cannot change without the
change of its physical properties.
Let us consider a more interesting case. Suppose an observerM measures
the x-spin of a spin one-half system S that is in a superposition of two
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different x-spins, 1√
2
(|up〉S + |down〉S). By the linear Schro¨dinger equation,
the physical state of the composite system after the measurement will evolve
into the superposition of M recording x-spin up and S being x-spin up and
M recording x-spin down and S being x-spin down:
1√
2
(|up〉S |up〉M + |down〉S |down〉M ). (5)
According to Everett’s theory, this post-measurement state (5) corresponds
to two observers, each of who is consciously aware of a definite record, either
x-spin up or x-spin down.1
There are in general three ways of understanding the notion of multi-
plicity in Everett’s theory: (1) measurements lead to multiple worlds at
the fundamental level (DeWitt and Graham, 1973), (2) measurements lead
to multiple worlds only at the non-fundamental “emergent” level (Wallace,
2012), and (3) measurements only lead to multiple minds (Zeh, 1981; Albert
and Loewer, 1988). In either case, for the above post-measurement state (5),
the mental state of each observer is not uniquely determined by her whole
wave function, and it supervenes on one branch of the wave function.2
Now consider again the above unitary time evolution operator, which
changes the first branch of the superposition to its second branch and the
second branch to the first branch:
1√
2
(|up〉S |up〉M+|down〉S |down〉M ) →
1√
2
(|down〉S |down〉M+|up〉S |up〉M ).
(6)
Then, like the product state cases, after the evolution the mental state of
each observer, which supervenes on the corresponding branch of the super-
position, will change; the mental state supervening on the first branch will
change from being aware of x-spin up to being aware of x-spin down, and
the mental state supervening on the second branch will change from being
aware of x-spin down to being aware of x-spin up.3 On the other hand, it can
be seen that after the evolution the whole superposition does not change.
According to Everett’s theory, the wave function of a physical system
is a complete description of the system. Therefore, after the above unitary
time evolution the physical state of the composite system does not change.
However, the mental states of the two involved observers both change after
1Note that in Wallace’s (2012) formulation of Everett’s theory the number of the emer-
gent observers after the measurement is not definite due to the imperfectness of decoher-
ence. My following analysis also applies to this formulation.
2It is worth noting that if the mental state of each observer does not supervene on or
covary with the corresponding branch of the post-measurement superposition, then the
predictions of the theory will be not consistent with the predictions of quantum mechanics
and experience for some unitary time evolution of the superposition.
3This is required by the linearity of dynamics. See below for further discussion.
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the evolution. Therefore, it seems that the psychophysical supervenience is
violated by Everett’s theory in this example.
There are two possible ways to avoid the violation of psychophysical
supervenience in the above example. The first way is to deny that after
the evolution the physical state of the composite system has not changed.
This requires that the wave function of a system is not a complete descrip-
tion of the physical state of the system. Obviously, this requirement is not
consistent with Everett’s theory.
The second way is to deny that after the evolution the total mental
states of the composite system have changed. For example, one may argue
that after the above evolution there remain a mental state corresponding
to seeing a spin up result and a mental state corresponding to seeing a
spin down result, and thus the total mental states of the composite system
have not changed. However, this seems to require that each observer has
no trans-temporal identity, while the absence of identities of observers is
inconsistent with the predictions of quantum mechanics and experience. If
each observer has a trans-temporal identity and her mental state supervenes
on the corresponding branch of the superposition, then her mental state will
change after the evolution, and thus the total mental states of the composite
system, which are composed of the mental states of these observers, also
change after the evolution.4
In order to avoid the violation of psychophysical supervenience, one may
even resort to a more complicated dynamics for the mental state, such as a
mental dynamics that keeps the mental state of each observer unchanged or
switches the two observers’ identities for the above evolution of the superpo-
sition (5). Certainly, for the evolution of a product state by the same unitary
evolution operator, the mental dynamics must still change the mental state
of the observer as usual so that it can be consistent with the predictions of
quantum mechanics and experience. Thus, such a dynamics must be non-
linear.5 Although a nonlinear dynamics for the physical state or the wave
function is obviously inconsistent with Everett’s theory, a nonlinear dynam-
ics for the mental state is not prohibited by the theory; the many-minds
theory is an example (Albert and Loewer, 1988; Barrett, 1999). However,
4By comparison, if for the post-measurement superposition (5) there is only one ob-
server whose mental content is composed of seeing a spin up result and seeing a spin down
result, then her mental state will not change after the above evolution, and the principle of
psychophysical supervenience can be satisfied (see Gao, 2016, 2017 for further discussion).
5A linear dynamics requires that the evolution of one branch of a superposition is
independent of the evolution of other branches, as well as whether or not these branches
exist. Thus, by the same unitary evolution operator, the evolution of one branch of the
post-measurement superposition (5), such as the branch |up〉S |up〉M in the sperposition,
will be the same as the evolution of the post-measurement state containing only this
branch, such as the product state |up〉S |up〉M . This is true for the evolution of both the
physical state and the mental state. Otherwise the linearity of dynamics will be violated,
and the resulting dynamics will be nonlinear.
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the existence of a nonlinear dynamics for the mental state in Everett’s theory
already entails dualism. It seems that this is no better than the violation of
psychophysical supervenience. Moreover, such a nonlinear dynamics seems
very ad hoc, and it is also difficult to determine what the dynamics is for an
arbitrary superposition such as α |up〉S |up〉M + β |down〉S |down〉M , where
α and β are not zero and satisfy the normalization condition |α|2 + |β|2 = 1.
Finally, one may argue that the above superposition (5) is a very special
state, and thus the violation of psychophysical supervenience, even if it
exists, is not serious for Everett’s theory. For other states, the amplitudes of
the two branches of the superposition are different, and thus after the above
evolution the physical state of the composite system, like the mental states of
the system, will also change. Then the psychophysical supervenience will not
be violated for these states. However, when the difference of the amplitudes
of the two branches of the superposition is very small, the change of the
physical state of the composite system is also very small after the evolution.
But the change of the mental state of each observer is still very large, e.g.
from being aware of x-spin down to being aware of x-spin up. In this case,
even if the psychophysical supervenience is not violated in a strict sense,
it seems very difficult or even impossible to explain how the mental state
supervenes on the physical state.
To sum up, I have argued that Everett’s theory may violate psychophys-
ical supervenience. The violation of psychophysical supervenience results
from the three key assumptions of the theory: (1) the completeness of the
description by the wave function, (2) the linearity of the dynamics for the
wave function, and (3) multiplicity. It is well known that the many-minds
theory violates psychophysical supervenience, and thus this result is not new
for the theory. But for the many-worlds theory, no matter the worlds are
at the fundamental level or only at the non-fundamental “emergent” level,
this result is new; a many-worlds theory may also violate the psychophysical
supervenience.
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